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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This study was initiated by MSFC, in an attempt to consolidate previous servicing studies into a
common database. In general, these studies have concluded that satellite servicing is a cost
effective solution over an expendable satellite. The potential benefit of a consistent database of
previous studies will provide a basis so that performance trends can be used when analyzing new
servicing missions.
Space Systems/Loral (formerly Ford Aerospace Corporation) was tasked with collecting and
reviewing the various program studies, and to apply the same methodology in an analysis of
currently planned and funded programs. This would provide an independent cost analysis of new
programs, and assess the overall life cycle cost benefits of servicing versus satellite replacement.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
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Previous studies have shown that satellite servicing
is cost effective
However, all of these studies were.of different
formats, dollar year, learn=ng rates, ava=labil=ty, etc.
It was difficult to correlate any useful trends from
these studies
This study was initiated to:
- Correlate the economic data from past studies into
a common data base, using a common set of
assumptions
- Analyze a select set of existing funded programs
to provide an independent analysis of the servicing
options and potential economic benefits
STUDY TASKS
The goals of the study were to;
1. Review some of the previous servicing studies primarily as background data, and for life cycle
cost (LCC) comparisons. The following programs were evaluated during the study. The
Integrated Orbital Servicing System (lOSS), Spacecraft Assembly, Maintenance and
Servicing, Satellite Servicing Working Group Studies, FAC/NASA studies on the
Geostationary Platform Bus, Communication Satellite Systems Operations (CSSO) with the
Space Station study, the Geostationary Platform Bus Study (GPBS), and the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Block 6 study undertaken for the USAF. The data
presented in these studies was transposed to a common data base and the costs normalized
in 1989 dollars.
. Develop new design reference missions (DRMs) that would be in place in the 1995 to 2010
time frame. The DRMs developed were for the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
(AXAF), the Polar Orbiting Platform (POPs), and the Explorer Platform. In general, four
basic missions were established: Expendable, Expendable Servicing, Shuttle Servicing and
Space Station Servicing. Shuttle and Space Station Servicing were not considered for the
POP.
3. To conduct (a) a normalizing of the economic data of the selected scenarios from existing
studies to produce life cycle costs (LCCs) and (b) economically analyzing the scenarios for
the new DRMs. From this data, parametric curves were produced showing the sensitivity
effects on the LCC by varying the satellite costs, reliability, servicer system cost and launch
costs.
...... . . .. , .....
STUDY TASKS
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Review previous servicing studies and generate a common
database normalized in 1989 dollars. Perform a life cycle cost
(LCC) analysis for comparison with previously generated results.
Develop new design reference missions (DRMs) in the 1995 to
2010 time frame. Examine the expendable satellite versus
serviceable satellite option scenarios.
Normalize the economic data for the selected expendable and
serviceable scenarios to generate life cycle cost data. Generate
parametric curves showing the sensitivity effects on the LCC by
varying satellite costs, reliability, servicer cost, and launch costs.
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STUDY GROUND RULES
The common financial base was established in 1989 dollars. Any input or derived costs were
escalated to FY89 dollars. The learning curve input was set at 100%, this was based on
experience with the INTELSAT V Program (a total of 15 satellites) and discussions with
NASA-MSFC on their experience with the Shuttle main engine program. The cost of money
was set at a 5% discount rate for LCC results.
A 10% uncertainty factor was assumed in all final result data for comparing the economic
benefit of servicing. This defined a confidence threshold in the results to establish when a
servicing benefit had been realized. This factor was generated by examining the correlation
data from Task 1, and from an estimate of the input data uncertainty for the Task2 DRMs
considered.
The baseline ground rule used to estimate Shuttle costs is based on a charge of $208M to
launch 56K Ibs to a nominal orbit of 160 nm, 28.5 ° inclination. This results in a $3714 per
pound. Then for the various missions, a table look-up is used to determine the capacity for
other than 160 nmi altitudes orbits, and a new dollar-per-pound factor is determined. The 33%
manifest charge is included for all Shuttle payloads if the weight and length of the payload do
not represent over 75% of the Shuttle capacity.
Space Station servicing related costs are mission dependant, but all payloads will require
handling, monitoring, integration and testing prior to the servicing mission. During the mission
staging period ORUs will be monitored by the Station Crew and it is expected that these
operations will require continuous support by the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Data
Management (DMS) and Communications subsystems. The servicing mission will require IVA
crew support, Remote Manipulator System (RMS) handling time, and possibly EVA. The cost
estimates include SSF Logistics Pallet Use $3,600/Ib; DMS Services $6,600/hr;
Communications Services $2,500/hr; RMS services $41,700/hr; EVA activity $123,000/hr; IVA
activity $19,000/hr.
STUDY GROUND RULES
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All costs are in 1989 dollars
Learning curve set at 100%
Cost of money set at 5%
A confidence threshold of 10% is used to evaluate the servicing benefit.
System availability will be held constant.
- Model will perform scheduled maintenance prior to failure
BIIBIIIBI
- Model will simulate random failures and perform maintenance on demand
Nominal Shuttle launch cost is $208M to 160 nm orbit
Space Station Freedom (SSF) user charges for servicing missions are
mission dependant, and vary between $10-30M It is assumed that the
servicing mission will require IVA and EVA crew support, Remote
Manipulator System (RMS) handling, and SSF support services during
payload integration and test.
Development costs of NASA servicing systems are paid by the NASA. A
user fee only is charged to each program
- Remote servicer user fee: $5M per mission
- OMV user fee: $6M per mission
- OTV user fee: $14.6M per mission plus fuel at $2100/kg
oSATCAV MODEL
SATCAV; a stochastic space mission life cycle cost & availability model was developed by
Princeton Synergetics, Princeton, NJ, and has been used as the prime analytical tool in this study
to generate program life cycle costs.
The model simulates launch and on-orbit operations associated with the initiation and continuing
operation of a generalized space mission comprising multiple satellites with a multiple sensor
capability. The model operates on an IBM PC microcomputer and utilizes a LOTUS 123 menu
driven input/output system to create a date-file that is accessed by a FORTRAN Monte Carlo
program that performs the computation.
SATCAV simulates satellite launch operations using expendable or recoverable launch vehicles
and upper stages and takes into account the consequences of a set of defined failures in terms
of cost incurring events and time delays. SATCAV simulates the random and wearout of a
multi-sensor satellite determining when specific failures occur and when maintenance actions are
required to respond to critical failures.
SATCAV encompasses alternative maintenance scenarios that include both ground and on-orbit
spares. Both launch on-failures and launch in-anticipation of wearout failure alternatives are
available. Different transportation scenarios may be selected for placement and maintenance
flights.
SATCAV also considers subjectively selected uncertainties and develops cost, event, and
availability statistics reports. It also develops a typical event timeline report.
SATCAV MODEL
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SATCAV; a stochastic space mission life cycle cost & availability
model is the prime analytical tool in this study to generate program life
cycle costs.
The model simulates launch and on-orbit operations of a multiple
satellite system with multiple sensor capability.
SATCAV simulates satellite launch operations using expendable or
recoverable launch vehicles and accounts for the consequences of a
set of defined failures in terms of cost incurring events and time
delays.
SATCAV simulates the random failures and wearout of a multi-sensor
satellite determining when specific failures occur and when
maintenance actions are required to respond to critical failures.
SATCAV also considers subjectively selected uncertainties and
develops cost, event, and availability statistics reports.
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RESULTS SUMMARY
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AXAF'.
- All of the considered servicing scenarios showed to be cost effective
over the expendable AXAF scenario. The expendable servicing system
resulted in the lowest LCC
N_
0
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POP
- Platform servicing was not cost effective if total payload replacement is
a requirement. A modified servicing strategy was defined to investigate
when POP servicing would be cost effective.
EP
- The Expendable servicer demonstrated the lowest LCC. However, the
Expendable servicer, Shuttle based servicer (FSS), and the expendable
satellite scenarios were all within 5% in total LCC.
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REVIEW DATA FROM
EXISTING SERVICING STUDIES
TASK 1: PROGRAM SET
A number of previous servicing studies were evaluated. As a basis for information two payload
models were utilized to formulate the candidate servicing scenario. These were the 1973 NASA
Headquarters and the 1974 NASA-MSFC payload models. These two sources resulted in a
combined 545 mission and 101 payload programs. The 101 programs was reduced in the final
count to 14. The following methodology was used to reduce the number of programs into a
manageable set to evaluate:
- Spin stabilized spacecraft were eliminated because of docking complexities
- Spacecraft with a recurring cost of less than $40M in 1975 dollars, and spacecraft with lifetimes
less than 1 year were eliminated because servicing is unlikely to be cost effective on a low cost,
short life satellite.
- Programs with launch dates before 1980 or those whose mission were complete, and would,
therefore, generate little or no interest, were dropped as were one flight or duplicate missions.
Spacecraft cost data were not listed in the lOSS published documentation, as NASA had provided
the cost data and felt that their release might compromise future procurement of the spacecraft. It
was therefore decided to back out the cost numbers from the expendable program costs, which
were given in the lOSS documentation in 1975 dollars. The expendable spacecraft program cost
figures were obtained from the Integrated Orbital Servicing Study for Low Cost Payload Programs,
Final Report, Volume II, Technical and Analysis, MCR-75-310, September, 1975, issued by the
Martin Marietta Corporation, Denver, CO.
TASK 1: PROGRAM SET
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The following programs were evaluated during the study
The Integrated Orbital Servicing System (lOSS)
Spacecraft Assembly, Maintenance and Servicing
Satellite Servicing Working Group Studies
Communication Satellite Systems Operations (CSSO)
Geostationary Platform Bus Study (GPBS)
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Block 6 study
Criteria was established to reduce the total program set to 14, in
order to maintain a workable number of SATCAV runs. The resultant
program set is representative of spacecraft servicing programs that
have a higher probability of being cost effective.
The data presented in these studies has been transposed to a
common data base and the costs normalized in 1989 dollars.
Spacecraft costs were not explicit in lOSS documentation, therefore,
cost numbers were backed out of the expendable program costs.
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TASK 1 RESULTS
The summary chart tabulates the SATCAV model inputs for the satellite cost, launch costs, and repair mission
costs, and the program life cycle costs. Each of the 14 programs are discussed in more detail in the final
report. The overall program LCC cost for both the serviced and expendable case are shown so that the benefit
of servicing can be established. In all but one case the benefit of servicing is positive. The metsat-L is a low
cost LEO satellite with a significantly high repair mission cost. If the satellite is not designed for servicing, or if
the servicing components represent a major percentage of the replacement cost, then the benefit of servicing
is small.
The chart on the facing page compares the new SATCAV results with the previous study results. This
comparison is made in terms of the servicing benefit percentage of each of the program. In most cases, the
results compare very well, and are within approximately 5%. The AST-7, and AST-8 were separated by about
15%. In looking through the data it was found that the SATCAV model initiated many repair missions and
replaced the spacecraft to achieve the mission availability over the life of the program. The number of
servicing missions initiated is highly sensitive to the input reliability data, and the constant availability
parameter assumed at the beginning of the study. It is difficult to quantify the exact nature of the failure
between the old and new results, but if the initial study did not maintain the same level of availability as the
present study, then that could cause the cost discrepancy. In general, the SATCAV model results correlate
very closely to the servicing benefit predictions of the older studies.
Program
IAST-5B
AST-5C
AST-7
AST-8
AST -9A
PHY-3B
NN/D-2B
NN/D-6
NN/D-12
NN/D-14
GEO PLATFORM
COMSAT
METSAT-L
METSAT-G
Satellite
Cost ($M)
165.6
109.1
210.7
57.4
168.2
100.2
76.2
83
91.2
87
850
70
40
100
Satellite
Lnch Cost ($M)
68.9
63.8
118.9
219.4
83.9
23_1
130.5
96.1
136,2
57.8
212
65.4
60
107,7
Repair Kit
Cost ($M)
36,5
30.5
41.3
36.2
36.8
41
43
42,9
34
26.1
733
44.6
45
47,1
Life Cycle Cost ($M)
qon-Serviced
2553.1
1420,5
3572.1
2355.6
3531.1
2134.5
3652.5
1675.3
4788,5
3178,6
7488
845
681
1273
Serviced
1778,6
1123.3
2277,7
2277.4
2177,3
1904.6
3227.4
1404.5
3250.9
1854
6564
675
717
1180
Savings ($M)
774.5
297,2
1294.4
78,2
1353.8
229.9
425.1
270,8
1537.6
1324,6
924
170
-36
93
Savings (%)
30
21
36
3
38
11
12
16
32
42
12
20
-5
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TASK 1 SUMMARY
The average benefit in the LCC costs due to servicing is 19.6%. This indicates that there is
potential benefit in providing the servicing capability in certain satellite programs. However, the
standard deviation of the results is about 14.4% indicating a large spread in the data. This leads to
the conclusion that the benefit of servicing is not overwhelmingly conclusive and each program
must be analyzed on a case by case basis.
Although the resultant data produced sizeable scatter, the trend indicates that the more costly the
unit price of the satellite the more benefit there is to building in a servicing capability. The results
indicate that the maximum cost benefit of servicing appears to be about 35% and that as the
number of satellites increase, the benefit of servicing increases.
The cost of launching a servicing mission must also be considered. The results of Task 1 show
that as the launch cost increase, the benefit of servicing decreases. However, all in all, the results
track reasonably well with previous studies. It is clear that for some missions servicing will provide
an overall cost savings.
TASK 1 SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m _a--__ It._ m
Average savings in life cycle cost due to servicing is 19.6%
- Indicates strong potential benefit due to servicing
Standard deviation of above result is 14.4%
- Indicates large spread in data
- Servicing must be analyzed on a case by case basis
Trend indicates that as the satellite unit cost increases, the
benefit of servicing increases
- Maximum benefit of servicing is approximately 35%
As number of satellites increase, the benefit of servicing
increases
Trend indicates that as satellite launch cost increases, the
benefit of servicing decreases
Results of the 1989 analysis track previous results, thus
validating the SATCAV model for new DRMs
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TASK 2 AND TASK 3 COMBINED
Task 2 and Task 3 are presented together for each of the 3 DRMs examined. This increases the
flow of the data from scenario development through analysis and results.
Task 2 Develop the servicing versus replacement scenario for each of the 3 design reference
missions (DRMs). The DRMs developed were for the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
(AXAF), the Polar Orbiting Platform (POPs), and the Explorer Platform. In general, four basic
missions were established. Expendable, Expendable Servicing, Shuttle Servicing and Space
Station Servicing. Shuttle and Space Station Servicing were not considered for the POP.
Task 3 normalizes the economic data of the selected scenarios and analyzes the data in a
parametric manner. The parametrics show the sensitivity effects on the LCC by varying either the
satellite cost, reliability, servicer system cost or launch cost.
TASK 2/TASK 3 COMBINED
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • __m_ L m
Task 2: ANALYZE NEW DRMs
• Develop servicing and expendable scenarios
° Format cost mass and reliability data
Task 3: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
• Use SATCAV model to generate program LCC
• Show sensitivity of reliability and cost
components on overall LCC
Design Reference Missions Included: AXAF, POP, EP
23
SHUTTLE LAUNCH COSTS
The methodology for generating Shuttle launch costs can be quite ambiguous, and one gets a
different answer depending who answers the question. A typical method uses the payload weight
and length occupied in the Shuttle bay to establish a percentage of the total launch cost. If the
weight (which includes cradles and supports) is a higher percentage of the total than the length
component, then the cost is based on weight instead of length. And similarly, the cost is based
on the length if the percentage of the Shuttle bay occupied is greater than the weight component.
Additionally, if the percentage utilized is not greater than 75% of the Shuttle capacity (either
weight or length, which is bigger) then a manifest charge, typically 33% of the payload launch
cost, is added.
The individual NASA program offices do not recognize this cost as applied to their respective
programs. They consider their manifest on the Shuttle as a secondary payload. In other words,
they occupy excess Shuttle capacity, and therefore, the launch costs are not applied to their
budget.
If this study adopted such an approach, the real cost comparison would be skewed to promote
Shuttle-based servicing in all but polar orbits. Therefore, Shuttle launch charges using the
methodology described above is used to generate a true cost comparison for the different
servicing scenarios.
.The baseline ground rule used to estimate Shuttle costs is based on a charge of $208M to launch
56K Ibs to a nominal orbit of 160 nm, 28.5 ° inclination. This results in a $3714 per pound. Then
for the various missions, a table look-up is used to determine the capacity for other than 160 nmi
altitudes orbits. Then a new dollar-per-pound factor is determined. The 33% manifest charge is
included for all EP Shuttle launches since the weight and length of the payload do not represent
over 75% of the Shuttle capacity.
The weight estimates for all cradle and manifest weights were obtained from David Douds,
GSFC.
SHUTTLE LAUNCH COSTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ mmmmm
PROGRAM LAUNCH
Explorer Platform Servicing
Mission
• FSS, Shuttle In-situ
Explorer Platform Servicing
Mission
• Shuttle/OMV
EP Servicing Mission
• Shuttle / SSF
ALTITUDE
NM
330
160
240
MANIFEST
PAYLOAD
(LB)
5500
WEIGHT
CRADLE
(LB)
10,900
$/LB
4,643
MANIFEST
CHARGE
%
33
18,000
11,950
5,000
8,400
3,714
4,020
33
33
SHUTTLE
LAUNCH
COST ($M)
101.3
113.6
109
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SSF SERVICING IMPLICATIONS
The chart below plots the waiting period between successive nodal alignments, as a function
of the difference in altitude between the space station orbit and the AXAF orbit. If the space
station is assumed to be located in a nominal 240 km orbit, then the differential altitude will
vary between approximately 53 nm to 80 nm. This will result in a waiting period between
successive nodal alignments in the order of 40 - 45 months. Due to this slow nodal drift,
approximately 8.4 ° per month, a 15-20 day window of opportunity will exist to rendezvous and
service the AXAF within a +3 ° nodal bandwidth. The larger the nodal bandwidth the larger
the window of opportunity, but the lower the transfer mass capacity. This window of
opportunity estimate assumes that both orbits are at the same inclination. Initial orbit
dispersions and second order orbit perturbations will result in inclination changes between
the space station and AXAF. Given the workload on the Space Station crew, launch vehicle
manifesting difficulties and potential for OMV failures, this imposes a severe constraint on
Station based servicing.
SSF SERVICING IMPLICATIONS
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AXAF INTRODUCTION: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
This DRM represents one of the 4 great observatories. The AXAF mission is designed to collect
astrophysical data over a wide range of the electromagnetic spectrum. The spacecraft is configured for
a Shuttle launch to a 325 nm orbit. The spacecraft has no on board propulsion and over a 5 year
period the orbit will degrade to 318 nm assuming nominal solar activity.
The AXAF spacecraft is designed for a 15 year mission with in-situ servicing every 5 years. During
these servicing periods, it is expected that the servicing vehicle will perform a velocity maneuver to
re-boost the satellite to a 325 nm orbit. The 5 servicing scenarios shown on the facing page were
identified for further investigation. Prior to performing the economic analysis, the five candidate
scenarios were evaluated to determine their relative performance. Each of the scenarios was ranked in
terms of mission cost, risk and complexity. Once each of the scenarios had been ranked, a down
select was made based on their relative ranking in terms of the these three factors. Two of the
candidate scenarios involved Space Station Freedom (SSF) based servicing missions were eventually
eliminated due to high servicing cost and window of opportunity servicing limitations.
Both of these SSF servicing scenarios involve the OMV, which has significant limitations due to the
orbital mechanics of two satellites at different altitudes. The final report shows the constraints and
capabilities of OMV servicing of AXAF from the SSF. The window of opportunity was limited to
approximately 15 days every 45-55 months. This severe servicing constraint increased the preparation
time, and cost, required on the SSF to assure that payload/servicer integration and test was complete
when the launch window was available.
The ground based scenarios generally received higher marks. The remote servicing options were
viewed to have the lowest complexity because of the reduced number of OMV operations. The ground
based retrieval scenarios were seen to be the lowest in terms of risk because of the high level of human
involvement in the servicing operations. Past experience on the MMS program has demonstrated the
human ability to improvise and perform delicate operations that would be impossible for a robotic or
telerobotic system to perform.
AXAF INTRODUCTION: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ l.-_L... m
Mission:
Mission Duration:
Constellation:
Launch Vehicle:
Spacecraft Dry Mass:
Spacecraft Cost:
Servicing Options:
Astrophysics
15 Years
1 Satellite 28.5 ° X 325 nm orbit.
STS
30,000 Ibs
$525.0 M (FY 89)
Servicing at the Space Station utilizing OMV for retrieval
Servicing in-situ utilizing a Space Station based SSS
Servicing in the Shuttle bay utilizing the OMV for retrieval
Servicing in-situ utilizing the ground based SSS
Servicing in-situ utilizing the ESS
29
SATCAV COST INPUTS
The AXAF Phase B study indicated that the projected servicing interval was 5 years and the
spacecraft would have a Ps of 0.44 at that time. With a Ps of 0.44, the SATCAV model predicted a
much shorter servicing interval and since it was felt that the 5 year interval was in good agreement
with past experience the Ps inputs were adjusted to 0.77 for the entire spacecraft. Since the
spacecraft is designed to be almost completely serviceable, the Ps for the servicing mission was set
to 0.88. This number is the combination of a probability of repairability of the spacecraft of 0.9 and
Ps of the servicer of 0.98.
The costs shown have the most significant contribution to the resultant life cycle cost. The
spacecraft and ORU cost inputs were derived from the AXAF Phase B estimates. Since AXAF is
baselined for servicing, the non-serviced spacecraft cost was estimated to be 10% less than the
Phase B cost. This figure was arrived at from the results of previous studies which indicates that
the cost to design a serviceable spacecraft is approximately 10% greater than that of an expendable
spacecraft.
The ORU charges were derived from the Phase B study cost estimates for the projected servicing
mission payload compliment. The Satellite Servicing System (SSS) servicer costs were based on
the standard OMV and SSS user charges of $6M per mission and $5M per mission, respectively,
plus an additional $4M in crew training and operational expenses. The SSS launch costs were
based on a STS launch. The ESS servicer costs were based on a recurring servicer cost of $30M
plus $4M in crew training and operational costs. The ESS cost was derived from an internal study
which determined that a low cost mission specific servicer could be manufactured for $30M,
assuming that the design could draw on key technologies from previous programs such as the FTS,
SSS and the OMV. The ESS launch charges were based on a Delta II launch.
SATCAV COST INPUTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m
Expenditure
Original Satellite Costs
Satellite
Satellite Launch
Total
Servicing Costs
ORU
Servicer
Servicing Launch
Total
Expendable
525
169
694
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cost ($M)
SSS
583
180
763
289
15
129
433
ESS
583
180
763
289
30
52
371
EVA
583
180
763
289
7.5
193
490
The ORU charges were derived from the Phase B study cost estimates
for the projected servicing mission payload compliment.
AXAF is baselined for servicing, the non-serviced spacecraft cost was
estimated to be 10% less than the Phase B cost. This assumption was
arrived at from the results of previous studies which indicates that
serviceability increases the spacecraft cost by 10%.
Expendable launch costs assumed Delta II launch vehicle
Shuttle costs were extrapolated from a nominal Shuttle launch cost of
$208M to 160 nm orbit
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AXAF RESULTS
The facing page shows a summary of the results of the AXAF economic analysis. Shown are
some of the key model inputs as well as the calculated number of satellites and number of repair
missions required to perform the mission. The life cycle cost shown is the 5% discounted value.
The numbers shown in the table are the average values calculated by SATCAV. The standard
deviations on each of the life cycle costs is approximately 10% for all cases.
The output data indicates that 4.6 platforms are required for the expendable scenario, and that 1.4
platforms/3.0 servicing missions are required to maximize the overall availability over the 15 year
mission lifetime. The interpretation of the number of platform or servicing missions, as shown
below, is the modelling implementation of spreading the costs of a new platform or servicers over
a number of years. No modelling techniques are incorporated to stop the implementation of a new
platform or servicer near end of life if a failure occurs. So if a failure does occur near the end of
the mission lifetime, then a percentage of the replacement cost is spread over the remaining
mission years.
It was considered a fair assumption that the EVA case could always be serviced, and therefore,
only 1 platform would be required. However, for the expendable launched missions, the model
used the probability of repair data (Ps =0.9) to specify if a servicing failure could occur. Therefore,
even though the system availability remained approximately unchanged, the complement of
replacement missions to service missions were not identical.
AXAF RESULTS
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Scenario
Non-Serviced
SSS Serviced
ESS Serviced
EVA Serviced
Satellite
Cost (SM)
525
583
583
583
Sat. Launch
Cost ($M)
169
180
180
180
Rep. Mission
Cost ($M)
N/A
308
323
338
Rep. Launch
Cost ($M)
N/A
129
52
193
Number of
Satellites
4.6
1.4
1.4
1.0
Number of
Repairs
N/A
3.0
3.0
3.4
Life Cycle
Cost ($M)
2364
2039
1938
2116
AXAF serviced with an expendable servicing system resulted
in the lowest LCC.
All of the considered servicing scenarios showed to be cost
effective over the expendable AXAF scenario,
The primary reason that the Shuttle based servicing scenario
was not the most cost effective was due to the higher Shuttle
launch costs.
The SATCAV model assumed that EVA servicing would have
a much higher probability of successful servicing over the
robotic servicing scenarios.
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AXAF PARAMETRICS
Once a baseline set of results had been developed for all three cases, 4 parametrics were examined to analyze the
sensitivity of the results to the following parameters: Satellite cost, reliability, servicer cost, and launch cost. These
parameters cover the major factors that determine the life cycle cost.
A satellite cost parametric depicts the effect of original asset cost versus the economic viability of servicing. In
developing the parametric for this case, it was assumed that the satellite and replacement ORUs were affected by the
same amount. The 25% variation was selected in order to provide a sufficient variation in the results to establish a
pattern.
The reliability parametric was performed to investigate servicing strategies. The baseline spacecraft contained sufficient
redundancy to provide a 5 year servicing interval. The satellite reliability levels were adjusted to model no redundancy
and triple redundancy. In addition the spacecraft cost, mass and launch costs were adjusted accordingly.
The servicer cost parametric depicts the impact of the servicing system cost on the total program LCC. Initially the cost
of the SSS was decreased by $5M and increased by $25M. Correspondingly the ESS costs were decreased by $5M
and increased by $30M.
The launch cost parametric was included to determine the impact launch charges have on the economic performance of
servicing. The launch charges were varied by +/- 20% to establish a trend. It is important to note that the percentage
increase in launch costs were assumed identical for both the Shuttle and the ELVs.
The graph on the facing page shows the impact of servicer cost on the economic performance of servicing for both the
ESS and SSS servicing missions. Since the goal of this parametric was to establish the amount users could afford to
pay for servicing systems, it was decided to run additional cases where the servicer cost was tripled and quadrupled for
both servicing systems. The plot clearly shows that servicer system cost can be increased significantly before the benefit
of servicing becomes questionable. The approximate standard deviation of the results has been drawn on the graph to
illustrate the maximum costs of the servicing systems. Reading from the graph it can be seen that the maximum users
fee for the SSS is about $60M and the maximum servicer cost is approximately $125M.
The primary difference in costs between the ESS and SSS servicing mission is the launch vehicle. Since the launch
vehicle is a major contributor to servicing mission cost, a second plot of the parametric 3 data is shown to illustrate the
effect of servicing mission cost on the economic performance of servicing. The X axis of the plot is "Repair Mission
Cost" which is composed of the ORU costs, the servicer cost and the servicing mission launch costs. The chart shows
that the break even point for servicing is with a servicing mission cost of $475M. This means that the sum of the three
mission cost components must be less than or equal to $475M for servicing to be economically viable.
AXAF PARAMETRIC
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AXAF SUMMARY
The study examined many servicing options and compared the total LCC to a similar expendable
spacecraft which are replaced rather than serviced. The study narrowed the option field down to
ESS, SSS, and EVA based servicing options. It was determined that servicing through the space
station resulted in higher cost, and the risk to the mission success was unduly jeopardized by the
short window of opportunity, and the long waiting periods between successive servicing windows.
The three servicing options all proved to be cost effective over an expendable AXAF. The ESS
costs were derived from an in-house preliminary study, as no funded ESS study currently exists. It
is felt that the technology for a mission specific-simple ORU replacement robotic system will be
available during the mission time frame. However, the costs were based upon the timely
development of the SSS and OMV programs. Although the OMV funding has been eliminated, it is
our opinion that a similar program with a limited scope should be initiated to fill the gap. We make
this recommendation based on the potential LCC saving resulting from this study, and many other
reputable studies.
AXAF SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • __'_-- • i
The data indicates that an Expendable Servicer results in a potential
LCC savings of 18% ($426M) over an expendable AXAF.
The SSS option results in a potential LCC savings of 13.7% ($325M)
over an expendable AXAF.
The EVA option results in a potential LCC savings of 10.5% ($248M)
over an expendable AXAF.
Reliability has a major effect on the benefit of servicing; it effects
both frequency and cost of servicing mission. The LCC cost results
from a unique combination of redundancy and servicing.
The parametric study has shown that if servicer costs are higher
than the stated baseline, servicing could still remain cost effective.
The exact value is dependant on the servicing scenario.
The data supports the conclusion that SSF-based servicing is not
cost effective.
The servicing window of opportunity from SSF is less than 3
weeks, with approx a 4 year waiting period before nodal alignment.
This severe constraint will result in longer lead time planning to
ensure the window of opportunity is not missed, thus increasing
servicing related costs.
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POLAR ORBITING PLATFORM APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
The current US POP Program consists of three EOS-A platforms and three EOS-B platforms. These
platforms have a 5 year mission life to provide continuous Earth observations for 15 years. EOS-A
series of platforms will support a payload of 3,000-3,500 kg, and provide 6 kW total power output. The
design life of each platform is limited by the expected lifetime of the Earth observation sensors. EOS-A
platforms are scheduled for replacement at 5 year intervals, but are being designed for servicing if an
effective means becomes available during the life of the mission. EOS-B platforms are envisioned to be
similar in design to the EOS-A platforms, but with a modified payload complement. It is the objective of
the SSES to model, as close as possible, the current POP architecture, and to investigate servicing
options that would directly compare with a replacement platform strategy.
The approach is to investigate the expendable and serviceable alternatives for EOS-A Platforms. No
attempt has been made to evaluate EOS-B platforms due to the limited data available. It was also
assumed that the cost trends generated for EOS-A platforms would be representative for EOS-B as well.
One expendable scenario and two serviceable scenarios are presented in this study. Many architecture
studies have been performed (see references) in the past to evaluate the benefits of various servicing
options. The two most recommended servicing options were chosen for the baseline servicing options
in this study: The Add-On Active Carrier; and the Active Carrier with robotic exchange capabilities. It
was assumed that each of these servicing options have the capability to rendezvous and dock with the
POP. In other words, the POP will not be required to de-orbit for servicing.
The Atlas II launch vehicle was selected over the Delta II launch vehicle to carry the servicer to orbit.
The decision was based on the recommendations of the Hixson Report, May 1990. This study did not
undertake a packaging analysis and trade study to justify this selection. The Hixson Report found that
the Atlas II could provide a much higher percentage of serviceable payload than the Delta I1.
The payload servicing strategy assumed the "replace at design life" method. All science instruments
were assumed to have a 5 year design life with a probability of success of 0.85. If however, the model
triggers either a launch or on-orbit spacecraft failure, a replacement platform or servicing mission is
initiated.
POP APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • _B--,_t m_ •
The POP-SSES will investigate serviceable and expendable cases of the
Eos-A platform series. No attempt has been made to cost the Eos-B
platform system.
Each scenario has been defined using available data, and by assumptions
when data was not available.
m
MISSION
ORBIT
Earth observation of global change events
705 km, sun synchronous, 1:30 pm nodal crossing
time.
LAUNCH VEHICLE Titan IV Initial Placement
Atlas II Servicing
MISSION LIFETIME
PLATFORM R COST
Total: 20 years
On-orbit: 15 years
$700M
SERVICING OPTIONS 1. Active Add-on Carrier
2. Active Carrier with Robotic Exchange System
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GENERAL POP ASSUMPTIONS
Servicing of the platform is limited to expendable launch vehicles, as no capability exists for Shuttle
launches to near-polar orbits.
The Titan IV launch vehicle is assumed for initial launch and placement of the platform, and the Atlas II
series launch vehicle is assumed for the launch of the servicing missions. The Atlas was the
recommended servicing launch vehicle, as mentioned previously, to maximize the percentage of
science payload serviced.
The ideal method of treating failures would have been to ascertain accurate POP reliability and
planning data, and to translate this data into a strategy consistent with model inputs that would trigger a
servicing mission when a specific threshold was reached. This threshold could be defined as a specific
sensor failure, a combination of sensor failures, or a bus failure. Two problems prevented this
approach from being implemented; An existing strategy with consistent probable failure data, and a
SATCAV model limitation. Although some probability of failure data was available in the D. Hixson
report (POP Servicing Study, Final Report, May 7, 1990), no strategy for specifying what series or
combinations of failures should trigger a servicing mission.
The model was originally designed for identical servicing missions, and therefore, is not capable
(without model modifications not funded in this study) of triggering servicing missions specific to
different sensor failures. Since the maximum expected lifetime of the sensors was 5 years, the
servicing mission was designed for that specific servicing scenario. An overall system reliability
number of .75 P(s) at 7.5 years, specified by Chris Scolese, Eos Project Office at GSFC, was used.
GENERAL POP ASSUMPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ LIml_i_L.K... i
No STS servicing capability to polar orbit
Atlas II launch vehicle assumed for servicing missions
5 year engineering development period
System level reliability of .75 @ 7.5 years was assumed
-- science payload: 0.85
-- Platform bus: 0.88
The repair mission assumed a 5 year expected lifetime for all
science instruments. If a failure occurred prior to the 5 year
intervals, the model would initiate a repair mission.
The SATCAV model is designed for only one definition of the repair
mission. The SATCAV model servicing criteria will initiate a repair
mission when a specific combination of system failures occur.
However, we were not able to ascertain a servicing strategy which
prioritized sensors to determine what combination of failures can be
allowed before a servicing mission is initiated. Therefore, system
level reliability was assumed.
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POP BASELINE INPUT COSTS TO SATCAV MODEL
The baseline costs for the POP scenarios are shown below. Most of the cost data has been extracted from the Hixson
report (May,1990), and some modifications were made with input from Chris Scolese, GSFC.
When a failure occurs, either total platform replacement or a repair mission is initiated. Total replacement is always
assumed in the expendable scenario, and only assumed for the serviceable scenarios if the platform can not be
serviced. A 90% repairability factor is assumed to account for the probability that the platform cannot be serviced. The
repair mission consists of a servicer and launch vehicle. Since the model is restricted to identical repair mission costs,
and a total of 3 servicers are required to replace the entire payload complement, a complete servicing mission must
include three launches and three servicers to replace the entire payload. To account for the reliability effects of 3
servicing launches per servicing mission, the launch vehicle reliability was adjusted from .98, as agreed in the mid-term
report, to 0.94.
Instrument and platform spares are not input into the model. The method by which the model accounts for the cost of
spares is when a failure triggers a replacement or repair mission to meet the mission lifetime.
The baseline costs for the Add-On carrier serviceable option were increased over the expendable case to allow for the
added development and hardware modification costs. GE Astro Space has concluded that 2 Add-On carriers could be
accommodated by the existing platforms without significant design modifications. Previous packaging studies discussed
in the Hixson Report have concluded that 3 Add-On carriers would be necessary to replace the entire POP instrument
payload. As a result of the additional design analysis and hardware modifications necessary to support at least 3
Add-On carriers, the NR cost of the platform for the Add-On scenario was increased by 50% and the recurring cost by
10% over the expendable platform.
The baseline costs for the Active Carrier, Robotic Exchange serviceable option were increased over the expendable
case to allow for the added development and hardware modification costs to incorporate the robotic system. Although
the current platform design is being designed for servicing, it was not known whether this includes the necessary
scarring to accommodate the Robotic Exchange System (RES). Therefore, the NR cost of the platform was increased
by 20%, and the recurring cost by 10%. Platform integration costs for both of the serviceable options were assumed to
be 20% higher than the expendable platform.
The WTR pad modifications was a point of some controversy. The $500M was verified by D. Hixson and included in the
POP Servicing Study Final Report. It was however, a questionable line item according C. Scolese, GSFC. The question
still remains unanswered whether the Polar Platform Program would bear the total cost of such a modification in the year
2000 time frame. An in-house decision was made to implement the full $500M in the baseline scenario, but show in the
parametrics, the scenario without the charge.
POP BASELINE INPUT COSTS TO SATCAV MODEL
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Initial Placement
Platform
Instrument set
Platform Integration
-Payload Integration
Total Replacement
Hardware Cost
Expendable
NR R
($i) ($M)
241 237
579 300
62
100
699
Add-On
NR R
($M) ($M)
361.5 260
579 300
74.4
100
734.4
Servicer
Active Carrier Servicer
Serviceable Inst. set
ORU's
PL Integration
Platform Systems
Robotic Each Syst
Robot Integration
WTR Pad Modifications
Total Servicer
Hardware Cost
50 31
100
50
20
23
5OO
0.0 224.0
Robotic Exch
NR R
($M) ($M)
289.2 260
579 300
74.4
100
734.4
50 31
100
50
20
23
100 30
12.8
500
,266.8
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POP RESULTS COST SUMMARY
The results of each of the POP scenarios are summarized below. The results indicate that servicing
does not appear cost effective given the assumptions and baseline input costs. The total discounted
LCC of the Expendable scenario is $3652M in FY89 dollars. The nearest serviceable option is
$4342M, an increase of $690M. The difference in the total discounted LCC between the two
serviceable scenarios (Add-on carrier and Robotic Exchange carrier) is small, approximately 1.6%. A
10% confidence factor was established at the beginning of the study to indicate a significant benefit of
servicing. A servicing benefit below this threshold was only considered a potential benefit given the
uncertainties in the input data and the calculated data.
The output data indicate that 4.6 platforms are required for the expendable scenario, and that 1.5
platforms/3.1 servicing missions are required to maximize the overall availability over the 15 year
mission lifetime. The interpretation of the number of platform or servicing mission, as shown below, is
the modelling implementation of spreading the costs of a new platform or servicers. No modelling
techniques are incorporated to stop the implementation of a new platform or servicer near end-of-life if
a failure occurs. So if a failure does occur near the end of the mission lifetime, a percentage of the
replacement cost is spread over the remaining mission years.
The LCC costs spans a 20 year program time frame; 5 years of development, and 15 years of active
on-orbit performance. If a failure occurred during launch, a new platform was launched. If a payload or
platform failure occurred, a servicing mission would be attempted in order to maintain system
availability for the full 15 year mission life. The serviceable platform assumed a 90% factor for a
successful servicing mission. No degradation of that factor was assumed after a successful servicing
mission. If the platform could not be serviced, then a new platform would be launched.
The serviceable scenarios have included a one time nonrecurring cost of $500M to modify the WTR for
Atlas launch capability. The possible exclusion of this line item has been examined in the parametric
analysis. When this NR WTR cost is removed the total discounted LCC difference between all three
cases is approximately $260M, or 6.8%.
POP RESULTS COST SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L_lW_m_._-- mm_m
POP 1
(Exp)
POP 2
(Add-On Carrier)
POP 3
(Active Carrier
Robotic
Exchange)
INPUT DATA OUTPUT DATA
Satellite Sat Launch Servicing Servicing Mission
Cost Cost Mission Cost Launch Costs LCC # # Servicing
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) SAT Mission
699 250 N/A N/A 3652 4.3 0
735 250 224 75 4342 1.5 3.2
735 250 267 75 4412 1.5 3.1
3 servicing missions are necessary to replace the entire instrument set
Expendable platform is the most cost effective solution
Add-On Carrier and Robotic Exchange Carrier are within 2% of each
other. Too close for a meaningful conclusion.
If the WTR NR cost is removed from the POP 2 and POP 3, then all
three scenarios are within 8%, which is below the 10% confidence
threshold defined at the beginning of the study.
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POP SERVICER COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of repair cost on the relative economic benefits of servicing. The
differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option versus a corresponding expendable
spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates that a non-serviced, replacement spacecraft
scenario is the most cost effective.
The plot shows that if servicing the entire payload is required, then the platform replacement is more cost effective.
The baseline servicing kit cost for 3 servicing missions is $626M, and the replacement cost for the Expendable and
Robotic Exchange option is $699M and $735M, respectively. In addition, the launch costs for a servicing mission (3
Atlas launch vehicles) is estimated at $225M, versus the replacement platform launch costs of $250M (Titan IV).
Clearly, these numbers do not give the servicing option much chance of being cost effective.
To obtain some useful comparisons with the following parametrics, a modified servicing mission has been defined.
The rationale was to reduce the number of servicers required per servicing mission. This was accomplished by
assuming only 2 Atlas launched servicers would be required per servicing mission. This will reduce the total payload
replaced, but it will also show the the potential benefits that servicing can produce. The following modifications were
assumed.
• $240M payload replaced
• $100M ORUs
• $40M Payload integration
• $60M Active Carriers
• $30M Robotic Exchange System
• $20M Platform Systems
• $10M Robotic Integration
The following parametric charts will show the potential servicing benefits of both the baseline and modified repair kits.
The $500M WTR pad modification costs have not been included in the following parametrics. It was mentioned
earlier in the text, that it was not clear from the available information whether this represented actual cost to modify
the WTR for Atlas launches or if the POP program would be charged the entire cost of such a modification. The
decision was made to include the cost in the baseline analysis, but to eliminate it from the parametric analysis.
POP SERVICER COST PARAMETRIC
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This chart shows the potential benefits that servicing can achieve as a
function of the servicing mission cost.
The Baseline servicing mission which consists of 3 Atlas launches for
replacing the entire payload is not cost effective as defined (ie. $626M).
A modified servicer mission which consists of only 2 Atlas launches
indicates a potential $150M LCC savings. This however, does not replace
all of the science payload.
Further benefits can be achieved if Servicer or ORU costs can be reduced.
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POP SUMMARY
The results indicate that servicing is not cost effective given the assumptions and baseline input
costs. The total discounted LCC of the Expendable scenario is $3652M in FY89 dollars. The
nearest serviceable option is $4342M, an increase of $690M. The differences in the total
discounted LCC between the two serviceable scenarios (Add-on carrier and Robotic Exchange
carrier) are small, approximately 1.6%.
There are three main contributors which undermine the cost effectiveness of POP servicing
scenarios. The first, is that the cost to repair the platform is just as expensive as to replace it.
The second, is that the costs of three Atlas launch vehicles, which are required to completely
replace the payload complement, is on the same order as the cost of a single Titan IV platform
launch, and thirdly, the $500M NR cost to upgrade the WTR for Atlas launches.
The parametrics shows that servicing becomes cost effective when the servicing ground rules are
changed. First, the $500M WTR pad modification costs were not included in the parametrics.
Then, a change in the servicing mission reduced the number of servicers required per servicing
mission. This was accomplished by assuming only 2 Atlas launch vehicles and servicers would
be required per servicing mission. This will reduce the total payload replaced, but it will also
show the the potential benefits that servicing can produce. Although this is a very simplistic
methodology, and cannot be directly related to the effect on system availability, it still provides a
reasonable basis to understand when servicing POP becomes cost effective.
POP SUMMARY
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The .Baseline results found that if tota payload replacement is a
requirement, then platform replacement lis more cost effective than
servicing.
In order to replace the entire payload set, three servicers and launch
vehicles are required. This drove the servicing mission costs to the same
order as the platform replacement costs.
The Add-on carrier and Robotic Exchange servicing scenarios were very
close in total LCC. However, the number of Add-on carriers required for
complete payload replacement cannot be accommodated by the existing
platform design.
The parametric study showed that:
• The trend of launch, servicing mission, and platform replacement costs
were highly dependant on the ratio of the servicing to platform replacement
cost.
• Servicing the POP could be cost effective if servicing mission costs were
reduced.
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EXPLORER PLATFORM APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
The current EP consists of the Multi-mission Modular Spacecraft and a platform equipment deck
(PED) to support various science payloads. The MMS supplies the entire EP with power, attitude
control, communications and data handling. Mission specific support equipment can be mounted into
available PED modules.
The First EP mission will support the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) which will be launched by
a Delta II launch vehicle. After completion of its mission (approximately 3.5 years), a second payload
such as the X-Ray Timing Experiment (XTE) will be launched by the STS. The Explorer satellite will
be retrieved, and the EUVE payload will be exchanged on-orbit with the new science payload.
It is the objective of the SSES to model the current EP architecture and to compare the servicing
strategy with an expendable platform and other servicing options.
The approach is to investigate and compare the economic benefits of expendable and serviceable
alternatives for the EP. One expendable and four serviceable scenarios are presented. Each option
assumes initial launch of the EP on a Delta II launch vehicle with the EUVE payload. Then, whether
or not the scenario is expendable or serviceable, a replacement payload like the XTE is assumed.
The STS serviceable options include, Shuttle retrieval of the EP at 330 nmi, Shuttle launch to 160
nmi and OMV retrieval, and Shuttle to SSF where the new payload is integrated to the OMV. The
last servicing option utilizes the Expendable Servicing System (ESS) launched on an expendable
launch vehicle.
EP APPROACH: SSES IMPLEMENTATION
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m __ m_L_mm
The approach is to investigate STS and expendable servicing options
for the Explorer Platform and compare with individual and expendable
platforms.
MISSION
ORBIT
Science, Astrophysics
330 nmi, 28.5 ° inclined, nominal
LAUNCH VEHICLE
MISSION LIFETIME
PLATFORM R COST
Delta II Initial Placement
STS, Delta II Servicing
Total: 11 years
On-orbit: 7 years
$98 M
SERVICING OPTIONS 1. Shuttle-based
2. Shuttle/OMV
3. Space Station Freedom/OMV
4. Expendable Servicing system
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GENERAL EP ASSUMPTIONS
The platform and experiment probability of success data was not available. In-house assumptions
were made. A P(s) of 0.92 was used for the EP bus at a 10 year mission life, and 0.96 was used for
the experiment at a 3.5 year mission life.
For Modelling purposes, the platform and cumulative experiment expected lifetimes were not equal.
The MMS has a 10 year design life, but not all of the experiments to fully utilize that capability have
been defined, so the model executed just a single experiment replacement. The experiment titled,
"Exp #2" is a simulation of the XTE payload, but no cost data was available, so a generic payload
was assumed. The assumption on costs for the Exp #2 was assumed to be 1.2 times the EUVE
experiment costs. Now, the implication of not modelling the Explorer Platform as a 10 year on-orbit
program will not effect the accuracy of the servicing versus expendable platform comparison. The
input to the SATCAV model only allows a single servicing mission definition. Therefore, the
expected lifetime for both experiments was selected to be 3.5 years. The system mission lifetime
ran for 7 years instead of 10 so that multiple servicing missions would not be triggered. The only
implication by this modelling assumption is that since the MMS has a 10 year design life, no failures
of the MMS would likely result.
The assumption was made, and accepted by MSFC, that the exclusion of Shuttle charges to NASA
programs, because they are considered secondary payloads, would not accurately compare the
Servicing versus the expendable scenarios. This is mainly due to the fact, that most expendable
satellites are launch on Expendable launch vehicles, and serviceable scenarios are serviced with
the STS. Therefore, to compare scenarios with consistency, Shuttle launch costs were included.
The chart to follow fully explains the Shuttle launch cost assumptions.
Some servicing versus expendable scenarios decrease the cost of the expendable satellite relative
to the servicing one to try and adjust for the fact that a serviceable satellite is 10%-15% more costly
to design and build. That assumption was not used for EP because MMS is an existing design that
has flight history. The assumption was made that it would be more realistic of a comparison to
compare all options with a common satellite bus.
GENERAL EP ASSUMPTIONS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ L-imi_d_.A--- m
The experiment expected lifetime is 3.5 years
A four year engineering development period prior to launch
Delta II launch Vehicle for initial EP placement and expendable
servicing m,ss,ons
EP spacecraft bus reliability 0.92 with a 10 year expected lifetime
EUVE and Exp #2 reliability of 0.96 with a 4 year expected lifetime
The NR and R cost of Exp #2 is 1.2 times that of EUVE
The Shuttle launch charges are based on a sliding scale based on
launch weight relative to launch capacity to orbit. The secondary
payload approach is not considered
The baseline EP is used for all servicing options. No platform
discounting is applied, even for the expendable platform scenario.
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EXPLORER PLATFORM SATCAV INPUT COSTS
The input data for the EP has been acquired from two sources. Rudd Moe, Satellite Servicing Manager,
GSFC, supplied the nonrecurring and recurring data for the MMS modules and the EUVE payload. Saroj
Patel, MSFC supplied the remaining data. The data was converted into FY89 dollars. It was assumed for
experiment #2 that the nonrecurring and recurring cost would be increased by 20% over the EUVE
payload.
For all of the serviced and non-serviced scenarios, the same platform and platform costs are assumed.
This is consistent with the philosophy that whether the platform is expendable or serviceable the same
platform, as currently designed, would be used. Therefore, the same launch vehicle would also be used
for initial placement of the platform. This reduces the cost comparison to the cost of the servicing mission
and related launch costs relative to the platform replacement costs.
The following chart itemizes the major recurring cost inputs to the SATCAV model. In the expendable EP
case, a replacement platform and payload is launched instead of servicing. It was assumed that for all
repair scenarios that one MMS module (C&DH) would be replaced. The C&DH was assumed since tape
recorders have a limited lifetime.
The Flight Support System (FSS) consists of three cradles which serves as an on-orbit servicing platform
and provides mechanical and electrical interfaces between the EP and the shuttle. The FSS is utilized
only for the in-situ Shuttle based servicing scenario. In the Shuttle/OMV servicing case, it was assumed
that the servicing modules would be stored on the servicer which is integrated to the OMV on the ground.
In the Space Station Freedom servicing scenario, the servicing payload is transported as cargo in the
Shuttle to the SSF.
The servicer and OMV costs were based on standard SSS and OMV user charges of $5M and $6M,
respectively. The ESS servicer costs were derived from an internal study to develop a mission specific
servicer. The $20M recurring cost and $7M NR assumes the design could draw on key technologies from
previous programs such as the FTS, SSS, and OMV.
Space Station user fees were derived from in-space service and labor task estimating parameters
obtained from S. Patel, MSFC. These charges include on-board EPS, DMS, Comm, astronaut services
for up to 10 days, and SSF storage for up to 30 days.
Crew training costs assume such items as planning, procedures, and crew activity planning of personal
and facilities. Also included, is mock-up, simulator design and construction costs required to adequately
train the astronauts.
EXPLORER PLATFORM SATCAV INPUT COSTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ I=m='___ = m
EXPLORER PLATFORM NON RECURRING QTY RECURRING
EUVE 68.4 1 28.5
MMS 18.4 1 69.5
MACS 6.5 12.2
MPS 4.5 8.4
C&DH 7.4 13.1
SOLAR ARRAY & SADA 6.3
STRUCTURE 11.2
ODC 3.4
PROPULSION 5.1
TDRSS ANTENNA 4.0
FLT SOFTWARE 3.6
MISSION Ee DECK 2.2
SERVICING COSTS EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5
EXPERIMENT #2
EXPLORER PLATFORM
C&DH MODULE
FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM
FSS LAUNCH SUPPORT
USER GSE
SERVICER USER FEE
OMV USER FEE
CREW TRAINING
RMS/EVA
SPACE STATION USER FEE
34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2
13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1
.0 _
2.2 ---
1.7 1.7 1.7
--- 5.0 5.0
--- 6.0 6.0
5.0 5.0 7.5
1.5 1.5 1.5
...... 7.0
63.7 66.5 76.0
1.7
22
71
55
EP BASELINE LCC RESULTS
The following chart summarizes the LCC results for all expendable and serviceable scenarios. The
total discounted LCC ranged from $409M for the ESS servicing scenario to $455M for the Space
Station based servicing. The expendable servicer system (ESS) was the most cost effective from a
bottom line cost stand-point. However, it was only 3.5% better than the expendable scenario, and
4.9% better than Shuttle-based servicing scenario. The level of confidence in this result cannot be
very convincing due to the maturity of the cost inputs for a program (ESS) that is not very well
defined. A more fundamental observation for the ESS scenario is the drastic difference in servicing
system launch costs (ie. Delta II versus the Shuttle launch).
This study uses a 10% confidence threshold of the difference in total LCC to make conclusive
comparisons. Such a comparison can be made for ESS versus the servicing scenario utilizing the
SSF. The total differential LCC is $46M, and the 10% threshold is $41M-$45M; therefore,
SSF-based servicing would not be cost effective relative to expendable servicing. However, the
results of the other scenarios are to close to make conclusive recommendations.
The output data indicate that 2.5 platforms are required for the expendable scenario, and that 1.1
platforms/1.3 servicing missions are required to maximize the overall availability over the 7 year
mission lifetime. The interpretation of the number of platform or servicing mission, as shown below, is
the modelling implementation of spreading the costs of a new platform or servicers. No modelling
techniques are incorporated to stop the implementation of a new platform or servicer near end-of-life if
a failure occurs. If a failure does occur near the end of the mission lifetime, then a percentage of the
replacement cost is spread over the remaining mission years.
EP BASELINE LCC RESULTS
SPACE SYSTEMS/ IL..__m
O
INPUT DATA
Satellite Sat Launch Repair
Cost Cost Cost
($M) ($M) ($M)
Servicing
Launch Costs
($M)
OUTPUT DATA
Discounted # # Repair
LCC SAT Missions
EP 1 98 55, N/A N/A 424 2.5 0
(Exp)
EP 2 98 55 63.7 101.3 430 1.1 1.3
(Shuttle)
EP 3 98 55 66.5 113.6 447 1.1 1.3
(Shuttle/OMV)
EP 4 98 55 76.0 109 455 1.1 1.3
(Shuttle/SSF) '
EP 5 98
(Exp. Servicer)
55 71 55 409 1.1 1.4
The Expendable servicer demonstrated the lowest LCC
However, scenarios EP1_and EP2 and EP5 were all within 5%, which is
below the established 10% confidence factor
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SERVICER COST PARAMETRIC
The graph on the facing page illustrates the impact of repair mission cost on the relative economic
benefits of servicing. The differential LCC is the difference between the indicated servicing option
versus a corresponding expendable spacecraft. When the differential LCC is below zero, it indicates
that a non-serviced, replacement spacecraft scenario is the most cost effective.
The plot shows that servicing is marginally cost effective for the Expendable Servicing System (ESS),
with a break even servicer cost of approximately $80M. The baseline servicer cost for ESS was
$54M. The break even point for Shuttle based servicing is much lower than the ESS case,
approximately $50M. The primary reason is the much higher Shuttle launch costs which significantly
impact the total LCC.
EP SERVICER COST PARAMETRIC
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m a__ ,k i
6O
_. 40 ESS
_,_ o .
_ U -2o
g_H
-40
The LCC benefits for each optio are shown as a
function of EP servicing mission recurring cost by varying both
the nonrecurring and recurring costs
The ESS servicing option shows LCC savings benefits over the
expendable scenario for servicing costs below $80M
Shuttle based servicing becomes cost effective over the
expendable scenario when servicing costs are below $50M.
The lower slope STS curve results from fact that launch costs
represent a higher percentage of the total LCC than the ESS case
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EXPLORER PLATFORM SUMMARY
The expendable servicer system (ESS) was the most cost effective from a bottom line cost
stand-point. However, it was only 3.5% better than the expendable scenario, and 4.9% better than
Shuttle-based servicing scenario. The level of confidence in this result cannot be very convincing due
to the maturity of the cost inputs for a program (ESS) that is not very well defined. A more
fundamental observation for the ESS scenario is the drastic difference in servicing system launch
costs (ie. Delta II versus the Shuttle launch).
Typically, these studies use a 10% confidence threshold of the difference in total LCC to make
conclusive comparisons. Such a comparison can be made for ESS versus the servicing scenario
utilizing the space station. The total differential LCC is $46M, and the 10% threshold is $41M-$45M;
therefore, SSF-based servicing would not be cost effective relative to expendable servicing. However,
the results of the other scenarios are to close to make conclusive recommendations.
The parametric analysis generated some important, but not terribly surprising trends. It was shown
that as servicer costs decreased, the benefit of servicing increased. They also showed that as the
platform cost increased, the benefit of servicing increased. The launch cost parametric indicated that
if the Shuttle launch costs could be reduced by 15%, then a break even point for Shuttle-based
servicing would occur relative to the expendable platform.
Although it was stated that no conclusive recommendations could be made to rank the top three
scenarios, the parametrics do allude to a few important observations. First, with the current Shuttle
costs it is almost impractical to achieve a 10% servicing benefit over the expendable scenario. And
second, the only reason that the ESS trends are so encouraging over the Shuttle-based servicing
option, is because of the launch cost disparity. So although the parametric trends indicate where the
break even points appear, the value of the Shuttle launch costs are the single most influential factor as
to how the results appear.
EXPLORER PLATFORM SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ B--__'='__ =" m
The total LCC for all the EP scenarios ranged between $409M and
$455M, a 10.6% difference. The 3 most cost effective scenarios were
within $21M; the Expendable servicer ($409), the Expendable platform
($424M), and the Shuttle based servicer ($430M).
The results do not indicate a clear advantage for either the servicing or
expendable scenarios. However, the data supports the conclusion that
SSF-based servicing is not cost effective, and has a much higher
probability of increased costs if on-station delays occur.
The SATCAV model results are highly dependent on reliability data to
estimate failure probabilities. Since no data was available, the
accuracy of the results is suspect. However, the relative difference is
still representative since most of the same hardware was assumed for
all mission scenarios.
The parametric study trends indicate that as repair and launch costs
are reduced, the benefit of servicing the platform increases. And as
the total spacecraft system cost increases, the benefit of servicing also
increases, as long as the servicing costs are significantly lower than
spacecraft replacement cost.
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NEW DRM COMPARISON TREND
This summary chart comparing the three DRMs is an attempt to quantify a parameter that will be
representative of new servicing missions. In sifting through the mass of data that this study
generated, we felt that the ratio of servicer with launch costs to replacement satellite with launch
costs captured the most influential parameters of a typical servicing mission. The differential LCC
cost is the difference between the serviced spacecraft LCC and the unserviced spacecraft LCC.
The data points for each DRM represent the scenario of greatest servicing benefit. In the case of
the POP, two cases are shown since the baseline cases did not show any servicing benefits. The
modified POP scenario represents a servicing mission in which not all of the science payload is
replaced. For more detail see the POP parametric section.
The chart indicates that for systems with ratio value of less than 80% a servicing benefit exists. The
lower the percentage of servicer to replacement cost, including launch costs, the greater the
potential servicing benefit.
An attempt was made to expand this chart to include data from task 1. Although the overall trend
was consistent with the new DRMs, the scatter in the data was quite large.
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SSES SUMMARY
SPACE SYSTEMS/ m m--._m_ • m
Task 1 reviewed 14 old NASA servicing studies, and analyzed them with a
common set of servicing and economic parameters.
- The average savings in life cycle cost due to servicing is 19.6%.
- The results of the 1989 analysis track previous results, thus validating the
SATCAV model for new DRMs.
Task.2 and Task 3 defined 3 DRMs: AXAF, EP, and POP: . Each DRM
examined the Expendable satellite versus Expendable Servmclng, Shuttle
Servicing and SSF Servicing. Shuttle servicing to polar orbit for the POP
was not an option.
- The data supports the conclusion that SSF-based servicing is not cost
effective.
- The servicing window of opportunity from SSF is small, and the waiting
period before nodal alignment is large. This results in longer lead time
planning to ensure window of opportunity is not missed, thus increasing
servicing related costs.
- Shuttle launch costs, as calculated, were significantly higher than the
corresponding expendable launch vehicle. This factor greatly reduced any
potential servicing benefits.
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SSES SUMMARY (con't)
SPACE SYSTEMS/ • m--_m_ k m
DRM RESULTS
• AXAF:
- All of the considered servicing scenarios showed to be cost effective
over the expendable AXAF scenario. The expendable servicing system
resulted in the lowest LCC
POP
- Platform servicing was not cost effective if total payload replacement is
a requirement. A modified servicing strategy was defined to investigate
when POP servicing would be cost effective.
EP
- The Expendable servicer demonstrated the lowest LCC. However, the
Expendable servicer, Shuttle based servicer (FSS), and the expendable
satellite scenarios were all within 5% in total LCC.
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